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ARTICLE 
 
Biodiversity Impacts of Investment and Free 
Trade Agreements 
LEE C. RARRICK*
 The following Article identifies the myriad ways in which 
international investment and free trade agreements interact with 
biodiversity. It categorizes these interactions into three main groups 
and provides a literature review of the various real-world and 
policy impacts. The first part analyses arbitration procedures in 
these agreements that investors and trade partners can invoke to 
protect their economic expectations from otherwise proper State 
action, including regulation that is intended to promote 
biodiversity. The next part evaluates biodiversity provisions that 
are included directly in the free trade and investment agreements 
themselves, or in side agreements thereto. Some of these provisions 
reference multilateral environmental treaties and attempt to 
provide stronger enforcement mechanisms for those obligations, 
while others create freestanding obligations between the contracting 
states and provide for dispute resolution procedures. The final part 
considers biodiversity as a form of intellectual property and a few 
of the various trade and investment agreements that regulate it as 
such. As the Article is not exhaustive of each interaction under every 
free trade or investment agreement, it is not possible to say 
empirically herein whether biodiversity is benefited or harmed on 
balance. But it is clear that over time these agreements are 
becoming more explicitly aware of their biodiversity impacts, and 
the contracting parties are striving for more of a balance between 
biodiversity protection and economic considerations. The Article is 
intended to provide insight into the wide range of biodiversity 
considerations that should be taken into account when drafting 
 
* J.D., Columbia Law School, 2019; LL.M., London School of Economics and 
Political Science, 2018; B.B.A., Ross School of Business, University of Michigan, 
2015; B.A., University of Michigan, 2015. I am thankful to Susan J. Kraham for 
directing me to this topic and to Lise Johnson for her guidance and feedback on 
earlier drafts. 
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future free trade and investment agreements, as well as enforcing 
those currently in place. It is also intended to apprise environmental 
practitioners of the potential roadblocks and avenues that these 
agreements create. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
International investment and free trade agreements affect 
biodiversity1 in myriad ways. In some instances they may be used 
to promote biodiversity and hold contracting parties accountable to 
each other for their respective conservation obligations. In other 
circumstances they may be used as a tool to circumvent 
freestanding international commitments or even to forestall future 
governmental action intended to promote biodiversity and the 
environment. This Article surveys some of the key investment and 
free trade agreements and provides a literature review of the three 
principal ways in which they impact biodiversity. While this is not 
necessarily an exhaustive review of the ways in which these types 
of agreements affect biodiversity, it is intended to give a wide 
overview of the common practical interactions. 
The Article proceeds in four parts. Part II addresses 
arbitration procedures in which investors and trade partners can 
attempt to hold contracting parties liable for State action which 
negatively impacts their economic expectations. This can include 
challenging legislation or regulation which is intended to protect 
biodiversity, but indirectly affects those investment or trade 
expectations. Part III evaluates provisions which create 
biodiversity conservation obligations for the contracting parties, 
either directly in the investment or free trade treaty, or through 
side agreements thereto. Some of these provisions will directly 
reference multilateral environmental treaties, such as the 
Convention on Biological Diversity, while others will create 
freestanding obligations between the parties and even establish 
separate procedures for dispute resolution. Part IV then considers 
biodiversity as a form of intellectual property and a few of the 
various trade and investment agreements that regulate it in that 
manner. 
 
1. In its Fifth Assessment Report, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (“IPCC”) provides a useful definition of biodiversity, adopted here, as 
“variability among living organisms from terrestrial, marine and other 
ecosystems . . . includ[ing] variability at the genetic, species and ecosystem 
levels.” Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [IPCC], Climate Change 
2014: Synthesis Report, at 119 (2015), 
https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/2018/05/SYR_AR5_FINAL_full_wcover.p
df [https://perma.cc/RU7B-UJMW]. 
3
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II. TRADE/INVESTMENT-PROTECTION 
ARBITRATION 
One of the core features of many investment and free trade 
agreements is the establishment of a dispute resolution system 
whereby contracting parties or investors can seek review of 
potential breaches of the agreement. This Part considers the ways 
in which trade partners and investors can use those dispute 
resolution systems to challenge governmental action designed to 
protect biodiversity, to the extent that those measures arguably 
infringe on their trade or investment rights established under the 
agreements. 
A. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade2 (“GATT”) 
establishes important free trade requirements among its 164 
contracting parties, as well as a dispute resolution system.3 The 
three most important substantive requirements are: 1) the most-
favored nation principle, 2) national treatment, and 3) a ban on 
quantitative restrictions.4 The most-favored nation principle 
requires contracting parties to provide the same advantages to all 
trading partners for all “like” products.5 National treatment 
 
2. See generally General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 
Stat. A11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT]; see also Understanding the WTO: 
The Organization, Members and Observers, WTO, 
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm 
[https://perma.cc/2E8U-89HU] (providing a list of current World Trade 
Organization members). 
3. Understanding the WTO: The Agreements, WTO, 
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/agrm1_e.htm 
[https://perma.cc/E8JY-S8LShttps]. 
4. Olivier De Schutter, Trade in the Service of Climate Change Mitigation: 
The Question of Linkage, 5 J. OF HUM. RTS. & ENV’T 65, 73 (2014). 
5. See GATT, supra note 2, at art. I § 1. The WTO Appellate Body has 
suggested a framework for examining “likeness” which includes four 
characteristics of the goods concerned: “‘(i) the physical properties of the products; 
(ii) the extent to which the products are capable of serving the same or similar 
end-uses; (iii) the extent to which consumers perceive and treat the products as 
alternative means of performing particular functions in order to satisfy a 
particular want or demand; and (iv) the international classification of the 
products for tariff purposes.’” De Schutter, supra note 4, at n.29 (quoting 
Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Measures Affecting Asbestos and 
Products Concerning Asbestos (EC – Asbestos), ¶ 101, WTO Doc. WT/DS135/AB/R 
(adopted Apr. 5, 2001)) (emphasis removed).   
4https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol37/iss1/2
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requires all contracting states to treat all foreign imports and 
exports at least as favorably as they treat like domestic products.6 
Finally, the ban on quantitative restrictions precludes contracting 
states from setting import or export bans, as well as quotas on 
foreign products.7 However, all of these requirements are subject 
to certain exceptions under Article XX, whereby contracting 
parties may adopt measures which would otherwise violate these 
obligations if they are, inter alia, “(b) necessary to protect human, 
animal or plant life or health,”8 or if they “(g) relat[e] to the 
conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such measures are 
made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic 
production or consumption.”9 These exceptions are in turn subject 
to the requirement that they may not be used as a disguise for 
restricting trade or used arbitrarily or unjustifiably to discriminate 
between countries.10 Arguably, these exceptions could be used to 
justify measures designed to protect biodiversity which would 
otherwise violate one of the substantive requirements. 
Several such measures aimed at protecting marine species 
have been challenged before the dispute resolution bodies 
established by the GATT. For example, in the 1990s, Chile enacted 
laws which limited swordfish catches and prohibited Chilean ports 
from accepting swordfish which had not been caught in accordance 
 
6. GATT, supra note 2, at art. III § 4. 
7. See id. at art. XI § 1. “This general rule, however, is tempered by some 
important exceptions, such as restrictions on agricultural and fishery imports to 
stabilize national agricultural markets.” Thomas E. Skilton, GATT and the 
Environment in Conflict: The Tuna-Dolphin Dispute and the Quest for an 
International Conservation Strategy, 26 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 455, 464 (1993) (citing 
GATT, supra note 2, at art XI:2). 
8. GATT, supra note 2, at art. XX.  
9. Id. It might also be possible to rely on exception (a) if the measures are 
“necessary to protect public morals.” Id. “The notion of ‘public morals’ was defined 
– in the context of [the General Agreement on Trade in Services] – as ‘denot[ing] 
standards of right and wrong conduct maintained by or on behalf of a community 
or nation.’” De Schutter, supra note 4, at 84. For a discussion of several theories 
under which biodiversity is morally considerable, see J. Baird Callicott, The 
Pragmatic Power and Promise of Theoretical Environmental Ethics: Forging a 
New Discourse, 11 ENVTL. VALUES 3 (2002); see generally Katie McShane, 
Anthropocentrism vs. Nonanthropocentrism: Why Should We Care?, 16 ENVTL. 
VALUES 169 (2007) (discussing the practical importance of nonantrhropocentrism 
beyond its impact on policy). 
10. GATT, supra note 2, at art. XX. 
5
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with the regulations.11 This was done in order to curb the rapid 
decline in the swordfish population within Chile’s Exclusive 
Economic Zone, brought about by an increase in commercial 
swordfish fishing in international waters in the Southern Pacific 
Ocean.12 In response, the European Community brought 
proceedings before the World Trade Organization (“WTO”) in 2000 
claiming violations of, inter alia, the GATT Article XI ban on 
quantitative restrictions.13 Chile then brought proceedings before 
the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea to invoke its 
conservation interests.14 Although the parties ultimately reached 
an agreement in 2001 and suspended both sets of proceedings, C. 
Leah Granger has argued that the international tribunals served 
to frame the issue in competing terms, i.e., free trade versus 
conservation, acted as signaling devices regarding the parties’ 
commitments to their claims and provided political cover for the 
parties during the dispute.15 Therefore, while there was no final 
decision under the GATT system holding as much, the dispute 
clearly pitted the economic obligations of the contracting parties 
under the GATT against Chile’s biodiversity conservation aims. 
There have also been several cases that concerned biodiversity 
protection measures which reached a decision under the GATT 
dispute resolution system. In the Tuna-Dolphin dispute between 
Mexico and the United States (“US”), Mexico brought proceedings 
before a GATT panel challenging a US regulation which banned all 
imports of tuna from countries that could not prove that they 
satisfied the dolphin protection standards set out in the US Marine 
Mammal Protection Act of 1972.16 The act also required that 
intermediary nations—those nations that imported tuna and then 
exported it to the US—also ensured that they had similar bans on 
the importation of tuna that was not harvested in compliance with 
the US requirements.17 The law was designed to ensure that 
 
11. C. Leah Granger, Comment, The Role of International Tribunals in 
Natural Resource Disputes in Latin America, 34 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1297, 1318–19 
(2007). 
12. Id. at 1318–19. 
13. Id. at 1319–20. 
14. Id. at 1320–21. 
15. Id. at 1318–24. 
16. See Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972, Pub L. No. 95-552, 86 Stat. 
1027 (2018) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 1361 (2019)). 
17. Skilton, supra note 7, at 459. 
6https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol37/iss1/2
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dolphins were not incidentally killed during commercial yellowfin 
tuna fishing operations using the purse seine method in the 
Eastern Tropical Pacific Ocean.18 The US also adopted the Dolphin 
Protection Consumer Information Act19 which precluded tuna 
products from being labelled as “Dolphin Safe” unless they met 
certain similar harvesting requirements.20 
In a non-binding report that was circulated, but not adopted,21 
the GATT panel concluded that the measures in question qualified 
as quantitative restrictions, rather than internal regulations, and 
were thus in violation of GATT Article XI:1.22 The US could not 
restrict imports based on the way in which the tuna was 
“produced,” as opposed to the quality or content of the product 
itself.23 The panel also concluded that the US could not rely on the 
Article XX(b) or (g) exceptions in order to justify the 
extraterritorial application of its domestic laws.24 In this case it did 
not matter that the US was trying to protect animal health or 
exhaustible natural resources because the regulation went beyond 
what was necessary to fulfill its objective.25 Finally, the panel 
concluded that the voluntary labelling scheme requirement was 
not inconsistent with the GATT.26 However, the parties ultimately 
 
18. Denis A. O’Connell, Tuna, Dolphins, and Purse Seine Fishing in the 
Eastern Tropical Pacific: The Controversy Continues, 23 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & 
POL’Y 77, 77 (2005). 
19. See Dolphin Protection Consumer Information Act, 16 USC. § 1385 
(2012). 
20. Report of the Panel, United States–Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, 
39S/155 (Sept. 3, 1991), GATT B.I.S.D., at 5 (1991) [hereinafter GATT Panel 
Report]. 
21. Under the pre-1995 GATT system, parties to a dispute had to adopt the 
panel decision in order for it to be considered binding. Skilton, supra note 7, at 
466. 
22. GATT Panel Report, supra note 20, at 41. 
23. Mexico etc Versus US: ‘Tuna-Dolphin’, WTO, 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/envir_e/edis04_e.htm 
[https://perma.cc/9EFE-YFG4]. 
24. Skilton, supra note 7, at 469. The panel alternatively concluded that the 
measures did not satisfy the requirements under either of those exceptions. Id. 
25. See GATT Panel Report, supra note 20, at 41. 
26. Id. In 2008, Mexico again challenged the US “Dolphin Safe” labelling 
requirement. The WTO Appellate Body found that it constituted a technical 
regulation in violation of the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade. Appellate 
Body Report, United States–Measures Concerning the Importation, Marketing and 
Sale of Tuna and Tuna Products, ¶ 407(a), WTO Doc. WT/DS381/AB/R (adopted 
May 16, 2012). 
7
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settled the issue outside of the GATT system.27 In 1992, the 
European Economic Community also challenged the embargo 
measures before a GATT panel, which ultimately came to similar 
conclusions that the measures were inconsistent with GATT 
Article XI:1 and did not meet the requirements of the Article XX 
exceptions.28 
Pursuant to the Endangered Species Act,29 the US also issued 
regulations designed to protect sea turtles from being incidentally 
taken during shrimp trawling in 1987.30 The US later passed a law 
which required imports of shrimp harvested from areas containing 
sea turtles to meet similar requirements as laid out in the 
regulations.31 In 1996, India, Malaysia, Pakistan, and Thailand 
challenged those measures as inconsistent with GATT Article 
XI:1.32 In this case, however, the WTO Appellate Body held that 
the US regulations fell within the Article XX(g) exception for the 
conservation of exhaustible natural resources, construing that 
provision to also apply to living species.33 However, the Appellate 
Body further held that the US measures did not satisfy the 
 
27. Mexico etc. Versus US: ‘Tuna-Dolphin’, supra note 23.  
28. Panel Report, United States–Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, ¶ 6.1, 
DS29/R, (June 16, 1994), GATT B.I.S.D., at 58 (1995). “Partially in response to 
the controversy that had developed over the GATT Tuna/Dolphin dispute, [the 
North American Free Trade Agreement] reproduced the GATT Article XX 
environmental exceptions within its text.” Madison Condon, The Integration of 
Environmental Law into International Investment Treaties and Trade 
Agreements: Negotiation Process and the Legalization of Commitments, 33 VA. 
ENVTL. L.J. 102, 107 (2015). For a fuller discussion of the North American Free 
Trade Agreement dispute resolution system, see infra Part II.B. 
29. See generally Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–1544 (2018). 
30. See generally Sea Turtle Conservation; Shrimp Trawling Requirements, 
52 Fed. Reg. 24,244–24,252 (June 29, 1987) (describing the regulations as 
intending to “reduce the incidental catch and mortality of sea turtles in shrimp 
trawls”). 
31. Conservation of Sea Turtles; Importation of Shrimp, Pub. L. 110–162, 
103 Stat. 1037 (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1537(a)–(b) (1989)). 
32. See Appellate Body Report, United States–Import Prohibition of Certain 
Shrimp and Shrimp Products, ¶ 1, WTO Doc. WT/DS58/AB/R (adopted Oct. 12, 
1998). 
33. See id. at ¶¶ 125–135. 
8https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol37/iss1/2
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requirements of the GATT Article XX chapeau,34 and were thus 
inconsistent with the GATT.35 
In summary, in several cases in which US marine biodiversity 
protection laws were challenged as inconsistent with the ban on 
quantitative restrictions under the GATT, the dispute resolution 
bodies ultimately found that the measures were in violation of that 
requirement and thus were inconsistent with the free trade system 
established by the GATT. And even in the absence of a final 
decision, resorting to the GATT dispute resolution system can 
serve to frame the conflict between free trade and conservation, 
and act as a signaling device of the parties’ intentions, as it did in 
the dispute between Chile and the European Economic 
Community.36 Therefore, the precedent analyzed here suggests 
that biodiversity conservation has generally been hampered by the 
GATT. However, it may be possible to draft future protection 
measures which fall within the Article XX(g) exception,37 and 
simultaneously do not run afoul of the Article XX chapeau. 
1. Comprehensive Economic and Trade 
Agreement 
The Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (“CETA”) 
creates a free trade zone between the European Union (“EU”) and 
Canada.38 It is considered a new generation free trade agreement 
(“FTA”), in part because it is designed to ensure that the 
contracting parties have greater room to regulate in the public 
interest through the express incorporation of sustainable 
development as an equal objective.39 Through CETA the 
 
34. The chapeau requires that contracting parties not apply measures “in a 
manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable 
discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a 
disguised restriction on international trade.” GATT, supra note 2, at art. XX. 
35. Appellate Body Report, supra note 32, at ¶ 186. 
36. See Granger, supra note 11, at 1322–1323.  
37. Alternatively, it may be possible to rely on one of the other General 
Article XX exceptions, such as (a) or (b). See GATT, supra note 2, at art. XX; see 
also supra text accompanying note 9.  
38. See generally Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement, Can.-
E.U., Oct. 30, 2016, O.J. (L 11) 23 [hereinafter CETA]. 
39. See Emily Hush, Note, Where No Man Has Gone Before: The Future of 
Sustainable Development in the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement 
and New Generation Free Trade Agreements, 43 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 93, 144 
9
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contracting parties also intended to incorporate the relevant 
provisions of the GATT, namely Article XXVIII:3, which allow the 
parties to regulate in the public interest without the danger of 
violating their other obligations under the treaty. Moreover, 
according to Emily Hush, CETA “arguably incorporates the 
relevant case law of the WTO tribunals as well, as can be seen for 
example in Article: 28.3.1 of CETA, which explicitly cites to the 
holding of the Shrimp-Turtle case.”40 Therefore, the above 
discussion regarding the GATT and the cases challenging 
biodiversity conservation measures similarly applies to the trade 
relationship between the EU and Canada under CETA. 
B. North American Free Trade Agreement 
When the North American Free Trade Agreement (“NAFTA”) 
came into effect on January 1, 1994, it established the “largest free 
trade region in the world” between Mexico, the US, and Canada.41 
NAFTA provides for three distinct forms of dispute resolution, the 
relevant one here being the Investor-State Dispute Settlement 
(“ISDS”) system under Chapter 11.42 The ISDS system allows 
investors to bring arbitration proceedings directly against one of 
the contracting parties to seek compensation for the 
nationalization or expropriation of their investment.43 According 
to the Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment, 
“[m]ultinational companies are increasingly using ISDS to 
challenge the legal and regulatory systems and policy choices of 
the contracting states, posing a serious and growing risk to the 
ability of states to govern in the public interest.”44 There have been 
 
(2018). Note also that removing or refusing to grant a subsidy does not constitute 
a breach of investment protection in and of itself under CETA. Id. 
40. Id. at 130. 
41. A New Canada-United States-Mexico Agreement, GOV’T OF CANADA, 
http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-commerce/trade-agreements-accords-
commerciaux/agr-acc/nafta-alena/fta-ale/background-contexte.aspx?lang=eng 
[https://perma.cc/DSL8-BMND]. 
42. See North American Free Trade Agreement, Can.-Mex.-U.S., § B, arts. 
1115–1138, Dec. 17, 1992, 107 Stat. 2057, 32 I.L.M. 289 (1993).   
43. See Daniel M. Price, An Overview of the NAFTA Investment Chapter: 
Substantive Rules and Investor-State Dispute Settlement, 27 INT’L L. 727, 730 
(1993). 
44. LISE JOHNSON, LISA SACHS & JEFFREY SACHS, COLUM. CTR. ON 
SUSTAINABLE INV., INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT, PUBLIC INTEREST AND 
US DOMESTIC LAW 1 (2015). 
10https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol37/iss1/2
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some high profile ISDS proceedings, such as Metalclad Corp. v. 
United Mexican States, where the tribunals have awarded 
investors millions of dollars in compensation for the “indirect 
expropriation” of their investments through State regulations 
intended to protect biodiversity.45 
In Metalclad, a US-owned company purchased a hazardous 
landfill site in Guadalcazar, Mexico.46 Although the company had 
the proper federal and state permits, the local municipal 
government denied a construction permit after the site had already 
been opened.47 The governor of the municipality then took action 
to protect a rare local cactus species by issuing an Ecological 
Decree which included the landfill site in a newly created protected 
natural area.48 The company then brought NAFTA Chapter 11 
arbitration proceedings against Mexico for indirect expropriation. 
The tribunal found that Mexico had indirectly expropriated the 
landfill and awarded the company approximately $16.7 million.49 
The award was ultimately reduced on appeal, but the tribunal 
affirmed that the Ecological Decree amounted to an 
expropriation.50 It is worth noting that NAFTA also provides that 
the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of 
Wild Fauna and Flora51 (“CITES”), the Montreal Protocol,52 and 
the Basel Convention53 should be given priority over NAFTA “in 
the event that a conflict of norms arose in a dispute,” so long as the 
 
45. Metalclad Corp. v. United Mexican States (US v. Mex.), Case No. 
ARB(AF)/97/1, Award, ¶¶ 107–108   
(N.A.F.T.A. Arb. Trib. 2000), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-
documents/ita0510.pdf  [https://perma.cc/PD8A-28QC] [hereinafter Metalclad 
Award]. 
46. Id. at ¶¶ 2–3.  
47. Id. at ¶ 50. 
48. Id. at ¶ 59. 
49. Id. at ¶ 131. 
50. See Vivian H.W. Wang, Note, Investor Protection or Environmental 
Protection? “Green” Development Under CAFTA, 32 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 251, 265–
266 (2007). 
51. See generally Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species 
of Wild Fauna and Flora, Mar. 1, 1973, 27 U.S.T. 1087, 993 U.N.T.S. 243. 
52. See generally Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone 
Layer, Sept. 16, 1987, 1522 U.N.T.S. 3. 
53. See generally Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary 
Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal, Mar. 22, 1989, 1673 
U.N.T.S. 126. 
11
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treaties are applied “in the least NAFTA-inconsistent manner.”54 
However, the tribunal did not address any of these treaties or any 
of the other environmental provisions of NAFTA in the opinion.55 
In the case of Clayton/Bilcon v. Government of Canada, the 
investors planned to build a marine terminal in order to ship mined 
basalt from Nova Scotia.56 However, the environmental 
assessment (“EA”) recommended that the project be rejected.57 
During the ISDS proceedings, Canada argued that rejection was 
appropriate due to the project’s location in an area “with an 
extremely productive ecosystem . . . [whose] waters are an 
important breeding and feeding ground for dolphins and 
endangered species such as whales and leatherback turtles.”58 The 
Canadian authorities were thus manifestly concerned with 
protecting the local biodiversity; nonetheless the investor objected 
to the EA. The tribunal ultimately found that Canada had failed to 
meet the requisite standards of fair and equitable treatment and 
full protection and security, and failed to provide national 
treatment to the investment.59 The final award was recently 
upheld by the Federal Court of Canada.60 
Cases like these highlight the fact that NAFTA has the 
potential to expose the contracting parties to ISDS proceedings 
simply for trying to protect their local biodiversity. They also 
establish precedent and might leave future environmental 
regulators with the choice of either exposing themselves to 
enormous liability, or choosing not to regulate at all. Such 
decisions may also influence the motivations for future EAs, 
 
54. Condon, supra note 28, at 107–08. 
55. See id. at 108. 
56. Clayton v. Can., P.C.A. Case No. 2009-04, Amended Statement of Claim 
¶ 19, (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2009),  https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-
documents/italaw1144.pdf [https://perma.cc/53BV-VG9J]. 
57. Clayton v. Can., P.C.A. Case No. 2009-04, Award on Jurisdiction and 
Liability ¶ 5, (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2015), 
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw4212.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/E8AG-UQVF]. 
58. Valentina S. Vadi, When Cultures Collide: Foreign Direct Investment, 
Natural Resources, and Indigenous Heritage in International Investment Law, 42 
COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 797, 876 (2011). 
59. Clayton v. Can., Case No. 2009-04, Award on Jurisdiction and Liability, 
at ¶ 742(ii).  
60. See Can. v. Clayton, 2018 F.C.R. 436, ¶ 200 (Fed. Ct.). 
12https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol37/iss1/2
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perhaps undermining their very rationality.61 This all suggests 
that the ISDS system could have a chilling effect on biodiversity 
protection regulation, as well as environmental regulation more 
broadly.62 As discussed further in the following Section, such 
precedent might also have a chilling effect with respect to the 
funding of certain biodiversity conservation projects. 
1. Concerns with Using the North American 
Free Trade Agreement as a Model 
The World Bank has funded a significant amount of 
biodiversity projects throughout the world.63 As David MacArthur 
points out, in some instances these projects are State-run, and 
have the potential to negatively impact vested economic 
interests.64 For example, in Mexico, the World Bank instituted the 
Consolidation of the Protected Areas System Project in order to 
“counteract the fact that ‘[t]he high biodiversity of Mexico is 
constantly being threatened by deforestation, over-exploitation, 
uncontrolled tourism, accelerated economic development and 
arbitrary settlement policies.’”65 Since the project is government-
sponsored, investors in such areas as logging, mining, and tourism, 
as well as landowners, could potentially bring ISDS proceedings 
under NAFTA.66 
The World Bank also funded a $186.5 million Water Resources 
Management Project in Mexico.67 Such a project could lead to 
establishing fishing quotas which in turn might negatively impact 
commercial fishing enterprises, opening up the Mexican 
 
61. See Vadi, supra note 58, at 837–77. Valentina S. Vadi, who has proposed 
using EAs as a way to also take cultural impacts into account when assessing 
investment projects, finds this to be particularly problematic. Id.  
62. JOHNSON, SACHS & SACHS, supra note 44, at 5. 
63. David MacArthur, NAFTA Chapter 11: On an Environmental Collision 
Course with the World Bank?, 2003 UTAH L. REV. 913, 917–18 (2003). 
64. See id. at 942 (“[I]t is not difficult to imagine foreign corporations with 
investments in coffee plantations soon to be inundated by a World Bank dam 
project filing suit against the sponsoring nation, or pharmaceutical companies 
with extensive research investments in tropical forests submitting an arbitration 
claim against a nation for the establishment of a ‘Protected Area’ under a 
biodiversity project funded through the World Bank.”). 
65. Id. at 943. 
66. Id. at 943–44. 
67. See id. at 944. 
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government to liability and potentially threatening its ability to 
repay the World Bank.68 While both of these projects took place in 
Mexico, the World Bank also funds biodiversity projects in other 
countries at various stages of development.69 Therefore, if the 
ISDS model is expanded to other FTAs, projects in the territory of 
contracting parties to those agreements could likewise be subject 
to liability, and the host countries could face increased hardship in 
repaying World Bank loans. Thus, David MacArthur argues that 
the NAFTA ISDS system, and similar systems in other investment 
agreements and FTAs, may have a chilling effect on the lending 
practices of the World Bank and similar institutions with respect 
to biodiversity projects in developing States.70 This concern is not 
merely theoretical, as in practice NAFTA has actually influenced 
other FTAs, such as the Dominican Republic-Central American 
Free Trade Agreement (“CAFTA-DR”).71 
In 2005, CAFTA-DR established a tariff-free trade zone among 
the US, the Dominican Republic, and certain Central American 
countries.72 CAFTA-DR is largely based on NAFTA, but “contains 
procedural and substantive changes that may affect the outcome 
of environment-related disputes.”73 As addressed below in Part 
III.B, CAFTA-DR does include some substantive environmental 
provisions directly within the agreement, allowing environmental 
regulations to take precedent over investment disputes in certain 
circumstances. However, not included within those provisions, and 
thus not shielded from the investment dispute mechanism, are 
regulations whose primary purpose is to “restrict[] the 
 
68. See id. 
69. Id. at 917–18.  
70. Id. at 942; see generally Jessica S. Wiltse, An Investor-State Dispute 
Mechanism in the Free Trade Area of the Americas: Lessons from NAFTA Chapter 
Eleven, 51 BUFF. L. REV. 1145 (2003) (expressing concern that less restrictive 
environmental regulations in Latin America will not protect the region’s rich 
biodiversity in the context of Free Trade Area of the Americas negotiations and 
NAFTA arbitration history). 
71. See Wang, supra note 50, at 254 (suggesting that CAFTA drew heavily 
from NAFTA’s provisions).  
72. See generally Dominican Republic-Central America Free Trade 
Agreement, Central American Common Market-Dom. Rep.-U.S., Aug. 5, 2004, 
119 Stat. 463 [hereinafter CAFTA-DR]. 
73. Wang, supra note 50, at 254, 274–75 (explaining that the procedural 
changes include open hearings, publication of materials, explicit allowance of 
amicus briefs, inclusion of an appellate mechanism, and further requirements for 
environmental cases). 
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management of commercial harvest of natural resources.”74 
Therefore, such regulations would be subject to the same attacks 
from investors as described above, mutatis mutandis. 
C. Trans-Pacific Partnership 
In 2013, Anastasia Telesetsky expressed doubt that either 
multilateral environmental agreements (“MEAs”) or trade treaties 
would be effective in eliminating “perverse” fishing subsidies 
which improperly distort the market and lead to overfishing.75 At 
the time there were two strong competing coalitions that were 
either pushing for or against further WTO measures dealing with 
these subsidies, or in favor of dealing with the issue in other 
forums.76 Furthermore, none of the MEAs in force at the time dealt 
directly with the problem.77 This was a pressing issue as almost 
40% of harvested fish was traded internationally at the time.78 In 
order to address this lacuna, Telesetsky suggested that States 
impose unilateral trade measures whereby they would eliminate 
their own perverse subsidies and require the same from their trade 
partners.79 This strategy closely resembles the approach taken by 
the US in the Tuna-Dolphin and Shrimp-Turtle cases, discussed 
above in Part II.A. Therefore, such measures would be vulnerable 
to similar attacks from trade partners under the GATT. However, 
Telesetsky argued that such measures could be upheld under the 
GATT Article XX(g) exception and the Shrimp-Turtle case 
interpreting it,80 so long as they were properly crafted.81 
However, Telesetsky has been more optimistic with respect to 
multilateral solutions since the Trans-Pacific Partnership (“TPP”) 
was signed in 2016 between twelve Pacific Rim States,82 which 
 
74. Id. at 277. 
75. See Anastasia Telesetsky, Follow the Leader: Eliminating Perverse 
Global Fishing Subsidies Through Unilateral Domestic Trade Measures, 65 ME. 
L. REV. 627, 628–29 (2013). 
76. See id. at 640–41. 
77. See id. at 639–40. 
78. Id. at 644. 
79. See id. 
80. See supra Part II.A (discussing GATT Article XX(g) and the Shrimp-
Turtle case). 
81. Telesetsky, supra note 75, at 644–48. 
82. Anastasia Telesetsky, Trans-Pacific Partnership: Leading the Way to an 
Environmentally Sustainable Global Economy, GLOBAL TRADE (Mar. 24, 2016), 
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account for approximately 40% of the world’s aggregate Gross 
Domestic Product.83 Telesetsky lauded the TPP for addressing the 
issue by requiring the parties to remove subsidies that are harmful 
to global fish stocks.84 She argued that this move “can have real 
implications for threatened species with Japan as a signatory of 
the TPP, which has historically assigned sizable subsidies to its 
distant water tuna fleets.”85 Although the US withdrew from the 
agreement on January 13, 2017,86 a similar agreement has been 
signed among the remaining members.87 Several parties to the 
new agreement are among the major players identified by 
Telesetsky in her 2013 article, including Japan.88 
In addition to the fishing subsidies, Telesetsky has 
acknowledged that the TPP addresses the issue identified above 
with respect to the chilling effect that investor-state dispute claims 
can have on environmental and biodiversity protection 
regulations.89 According to Telesetsky, not only does the TPP 
 
https://www.globaltrademag.com/trans-pacific-partnership-leading-the-way-to-
an-environmentally-sustainable-global-economy/ [https://perma.cc/Z2GH-3KH2]. 
83. See Kevin Granville, What Is TPP? Behind the Trade Deal That Died, 
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 23, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/business/tpp-explained-what-is-trans-
pacific-partnership.html [https://perma.cc/DRM2-RDG6]. 
84. Telesetsky, supra note 82 (explaining that the TPP also requires parties 
to “eliminate overcapacity of fishing vessels and deter illegal, unreported, and 
unregulated fishing”). 
85. Id. 
86. See generally Ylan Q. Mui, Withdrawal from Trans-Pacific Partnership 
Shifts US Role in World Economy, WASH. POST (Jan. 23, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/withdrawal-from-trans-
pacific-partnership-shifts-us-role-in-world-economy/2017/01/23/05720df6-e1a6-
11e6-a453-19ec4b3d09ba_story.html?utm_term=.3c473065f9f5 
[https://perma.cc/2QGP-6NCK]; but see generally Dominic Rushe, Trump Said to 
be Reviewing Trans-Pacific Partnership in Trade U-Turn, GUARDIAN (Apr. 12, 
2018), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/apr/12/trump-trans-pacific-
partnership-trade-deal-reversal [https://perma.cc/4FQQ-WTDT].  
87. See generally Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-
Pacific Partnership, Mar. 8, 2018, available at AUSTRALIAN GOV’T DEP’T OF 
FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND TRADE, https://dfat.gov.au/trade/agreements/in-
force/cptpp/official-documents/Documents/tpp-11-treaty-text.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/HZ3H-5KKR] [hereinafter CPTPP]. 
88. Those parties are Australia, Chile, Japan, New Zealand, and Peru. See 
Telesetsky, supra note 75, at 640–41. 
89. Telesetsky, supra note 84 (“The TPP also enables countries to control 
company-sourcing practices for the purpose of environmental sustainability. The 
TPP is clear that countries can place requirements on the purchase or use of goods 
within its territory that justifiably protect ‘human, animal or plant life or health’ 
16https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol37/iss1/2
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provide considerable latitude for host states to regulate in order to 
protect public health and the environment, inter alia, it also allows 
the States where the investment originates to do the same.90 
Finally, as discussed in more detail below in Part III.C, the TPP 
and the replacement agreement both have chapters dedicated 
specifically to the environment which create commitments 
enforceable through the dispute settlement processes.91 
D. Climate Change Impacts 
Climate change is likely to negatively impact biodiversity in a 
multitude of ways. For example, climate change is projected to 
cause redistribution of species, tree mortality and worsening of 
forest fires, as well as ocean acidification and deoxygenation which 
could directly threaten the survival of marine species.92 Moreover, 
some of these changes will create knock-on effects further 
contributing to the problem of climate change, for example through 
the loss of carbon sinks and the release of further emissions.93 It is 
the goal of the parties to the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change to stabilize greenhouse gas 
(“GHG”) concentrations “at a level that would prevent dangerous 
anthropogenic interference with the climate system . . . . within a 
time frame sufficient to allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to 
 
or conserve ‘living or non-living exhaustible natural resources.’”). But see 
Catherine Ho, Fact-Checking the Campaigns for and Against the TPP Trade 
Deal, WASH. POST (Feb. 11, 2016) (highlighting the concern of some that the “TPP 
will lead to more companies challenging environmental regulations in the 
arbitration process”), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/powerpost/wp/2016/02/11/fact-checking-
the-campaigns-for-and-against-the-tpp-trade-deal/ [https://perma.cc/LAX4-
KHSA]. 
90. Telesetsky, supra note 84. 
91. See infra Part III (further discussing environmental provisions and side 
agreements). 
92. See IPCC, supra note 1, at 51, 64, 67; see also AUGUSTIN COLETTE, 
UNESCO WORLD HERITAGE CENTRE, CASE STUDIES ON CLIMATE CHANGE AND 
WORLD HERITAGE 29, 40 (2007) (detailing the predicted marine and terrestrial 
biodiversity impacts brought about by changing ocean chemistry, as well as 
“rising atmospheric temperatures, increasing atmospheric CO2 concentrations, 
changes in precipitation patterns and hydrological cycles, increased frequency of 
extreme weather events, etc.”). 
93. See IPCC, supra note 1, at 51, 62, 67. 
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climate change . . . .”94  However, it is unlikely that all species will 
be able to adapt naturally at the current warming rates projected 
by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.95 Therefore, 
to the extent that international trade and investment agreements 
affect climate change, they can also be seen to impact biodiversity. 
According to the WTO, the liberalization of trade generally can 
have both positive and negative impacts on climate change.96 First, 
freer trade can result in increased economic activity and output, 
which in turn tends to increase energy consumption and GHG 
emissions.97 However, the WTO also notes that increased income 
tends to allow societies to demand reduced emissions.98 Second, 
freer trade incentivizes countries to take advantage of comparative 
advantages by reallocating resources to their most efficient use.99 
This can have either a positive or negative effect in any given State, 
depending upon whether it allocates its resources to sectors which 
are more or less energy intensive. Third, trade liberalization can 
allow for advances in energy technology—increasing efficiency, 
reducing emissions, and lowering costs.100 Finally, increased trade 
necessitates increased transportation, and thus tends to raise 
GHG emissions in that sector.101 
Valentina S. Vadi has argued that international investment 
law can help to mitigate climate change through encouraging 
foreign direct investment in renewables as well as by preventing 
parties from backsliding from earlier commitments.102 
Nevertheless, Vadi acknowledges that investment treaties can also 
 
94. U. N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, art. 2, May 9, 1992, 
1771 U.N.T.S. 107. 
95. See IPCC, supra note 1, at 72. 
96. See The Impact of Trade Opening on Climate Change, WTO, 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/envir_e/climate_impact_e.htm 
[https://perma.cc/E4TM-X8MU] [hereinafter WTO Trade Impact]. 
97. Id. 
98. See The Multilateral Trading System and Climate Change: Introduction, 
WTO, https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/envir_e/climate_intro_e.htm 
[https://perma.cc/9NLD-9YSE]. 
99. WTO Trade Impact, supra note 96.  
100. Id.; but see De Schutter, supra note 4, at 69 (“[S]tudies are now 
converging to show that . . . the increased consumption allowed by trade 
expansion raises levels of [GHG] emissions more than the technological spillover 
effects of trade lead to GHG emissions being reduced.”). 
101. WTO Trade Impact, supra note 96. 
102. Valentina Vadi, Beyond Known Worlds: Climate Change Governance by 
Arbitral Tribunals?, 48 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1285, 1350 (2015). 
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hinder climate change mitigation where investors are able to 
challenge domestic environmental or clean energy regulations that 
negatively impact investments through arbitration proceedings, 
especially in the energy sector.103 Shalanda H. Baker has also 
suggested that climate change may alter the investment 
environment conditions in developing countries such that they 
could be held liable in investment arbitration under investment 
treaties.104 Baker suggests marshalling legal doctrines such as 
rebus sic stantibus in order to allow developing states impacted by 
climate change to exit or modify those agreements.105 
III. BIODIVERSITY PROTECTION PROVISIONS 
AND SIDE AGREEMENTS 
In addition to allowing investors and trade partners to 
challenge biodiversity protection actions through arbitration, 
international investment and free trade agreements may also 
directly address biodiversity obligations in the text of the 
agreement itself, or in agreements negotiated in parallel thereto. 
The following Part first reviews the North American Agreement on 
Environmental Cooperation, a side agreement to NAFTA, which 
establishes a claims process whereby an independent body may 
review whether the contracting parties are effectively enforcing 
their own environmental regulations. This process has been used 
in the context of biodiversity conservation, and has an analogue in 
the provisions of the CAFTA-DR, discussed thereafter. This Part 
then discusses the TPP, which includes biodiversity and other 
environmental provisions directly within the text of the 
agreement. Finally, it evaluates the US-Peru FTA as one example 
of the more recent trend of incorporating obligations from MEAs 
and/or domestic laws into the text of the free trade and investment 
agreements in order to create additional enforcement mechanisms 
for those obligations. 
A. North American Agreement on Environmental 
 
103. Id. 
104. Shalanda H. Baker, Climate Change and International Economic Law, 
43 ECOLOGY L.Q. 53, 93 (2016). 
105. Id. at 82–83. The doctrine of rebus sic stantibus is employed to render 
treaty or contract provisions inapplicable in light of substantial changes in 
circumstances. Id. 
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Cooperation 
The North American Agreement on Environmental 
Cooperation106 (“NAAEC”) is an agreement that was negotiated 
alongside NAFTA.107 The NAAEC requires each of the contracting 
parties to provide information on its environmental laws and 
regulations, promote environmental education, report on the state 
of its environment, and promote research and technology 
development.108 It further requires the contracting parties to 
enforce their environmental laws and regulations, provide 
appropriate enforcement proceedings, and ensure adequate access 
to private remedies.109 The NAAEC also allows the parties to bring 
arbitration proceedings to investigate potential “persistent 
pattern[s]” of non-enforcement of another party’s environmental 
laws.110 If the arbitral panel finds such a violation, it will create an 
action plan to bring the party into compliance and can even impose 
a fine—the funds of which will ultimately be used to improve 
enforcement in that State.111 In addition, the NAAEC established 
the Commission for Environmental Cooperation (the 
“Commission”) which oversees various enforcement issues.112 
Finally, Article 14 allows non-governmental organizations or other 
persons to bring claims before the Secretariat of the Commission if 
one of the contracting parties is failing to enforce its own 
environmental laws.113 
As identified by Aaron Holland, this claim process was used to 
challenge the “Hutchison Rider,” which cut the budget of the US 
Fish and Wildlife Service for administering the Endangered 
Species Act, and proscribed it from listing any further species as 
endangered or threatened during the remainder of fiscal year 
1995.114 The petitioners challenged this action on the basis that it 
 
106. See generally North American Agreement on Environment Cooperation, 
Sept. 14, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1480 [hereinafter NAAEC]. 
107. Condon, supra note 28, at 107 (noting that “NAFTA was the first United 
States trade agreement to explicitly include environment provisions”). 
108. NAAEC, supra note 106, at art. 2, art. 4.  
109. See id. at art. 5–art. 7.  
110. See id. at art. 24. 
111. See Condon, supra note 28, at 109. 
112. NAAEC, supra note 106, at art. 8–19. 
113. Id. at art. 14.  
114. Aaron Holland, The North American Agreement on Environmental 
Cooperation: The Effect of the North American Free Trade Agreement on the 
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effectively suspended the enforcement of the Endangered Species 
Act.115 The process was also used to challenge a similar rider which 
suspended enforcement of US logging laws.116 However, the 
Secretariat of the Commission did not uphold either of the 
challenges because it found that each were legislative actions, and 
thus were outside the scope of the failure to enforce environmental 
laws or regulations provision.117 Essentially, the riders were new 
US environmental laws and the implementing agencies were 
simply complying with the new requirements by not enforcing the 
older laws.118 
Finally, the Commission can also consider environmental 
issues and provide recommendations to the parties.119 On 
November 8, 2004, the Commission issued a report entitled “Maize 
and Biodiversity: The Effects of Transgenic Maize in Mexico,” 
which addressed the spread and intermixing of genetically 
modified corn with native species in Oaxaca, Mexico.120 There is 
concern that these genetically modified crops could “contaminate” 
the genes of native crops and damage the local biodiversity.121 The 
Commission’s report recommended various measures, including 
“additional research, a continuation of the moratorium on planting 
genetically modified corn in Mexico unless carefully planned and 
contained in an experimental setting, preservation of the genetic 
diversity of Mexican corn, and application of an ‘as low as is 
reasonably achievable’ standard in adopting risk-reducing 
policies.”122 Due to a prolonged legal battle, the temporary ban on 
 
Enforcement of United States Environmental Laws, 28 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 1219, 
1233–34 (1997). 
115. Id. at 1234.  
116. Id. at 1235–36. 
117. Id. at 1236. 
118. Id. Later treaties that include similar review procedures generally do 
not seem to address this issue. See, e.g., CPTPP, supra note 87, at art. 20; CAFTA-
DR, supra note 72, at art. 17.7. 
119. NAAEC, supra note 106, at art. 10. 
120. David W. Wagner & William L. Thomas, International Environmental 
Law, 39 INT’L L. 191, 203 (2005). 
121. See Kate Wong, GM Corn Contaminates Distant Native Plants, SCI. AM. 
(Nov. 29, 2001), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/gm-corn-
contaminates-dist/ [https://perma.cc/XUF3-5LRY]. 
122. Wagner & Thomas, supra note 120, at 203–04. 
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planting genetically modified corn in Mexico has remained in 
place, and is likely to continue for at least several years.123 
B. Dominican Republic-Central America Free Trade 
Agreement 
Since the NAAEC was signed, environmental provisions, 
including those addressing biodiversity, have become increasingly 
common in investment and free trade agreements.124 The more 
recent trend though, exemplified by the CAFTA-DR, has been to 
include the provisions directly within the text of the agreement 
itself, rather than in a side agreement thereto.125 As mentioned 
above in Part II.B.1, CAFTA-DR establishes a free trade zone 
between the Dominican Republic, the US, and the Central 
American Common Market.126 Included within Chapter 17—the 
environmental chapter—is a non-enforcement challenging process 
similar to that of the NAAEC, described above in Part III.A.127 
However, explicitly excluded from its scope are laws whose 
primary purpose “is managing the commercial harvest or 
exploitation, or subsistence or aboriginal harvesting, of natural 
resources.”128 
Vivian H.W. Wang has argued that Costa Rica’s Biodiversity 
law could meet that description as it regulates the bioprospecting 
process of genome collection.129 Ultimately, it will be a matter of 
interpreting what “primary purpose” means, as the law also 
addresses issues such as environmental impact reports and 
 
123. David Alire Garcia, Monsanto Sees Prolonged Delay on GMO Corn 
Permits in Mexico, THOMSON REUTERS (Jan. 30, 2017), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mexico-monsanto/monsanto-sees-prolonged-
delay-on-gmo-corn-permits-in-mexico-idUSKBN15E1DJ [https://perma.cc/7A3E-
2XGL]. 
124. See Condon, supra note 28, at 109–10. For an example of a nation 
advocating for the inclusion of environmental considerations into a trade 
agreement, see Katia Fach Gómez, Latin America and ICSID: David Versus 
Goliath, 17 L. & BUS. REV. AM. 195, 219 (2011) (discussing Bolivia’s previously 
proposed bilateral investment treaty with the US which sought, inter alia, to 
“protect Bolivia’s wealth of traditional knowledge and rich biodiversity”). 
125. See Condon, supra note 28, at 109–10 (citing FTAs with Australia, 
Bahrain, Chile, Morocco, and Oman as other examples of such agreements). 
126. See CAFTA-DR, supra note 72, at Preamble. 
127. Id. at art. 17.7. 
128. Id. at art. 17.13. 
129. Wang, supra note 50, at 280. 
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conservation.130 However, if it is ultimately determined to fall 
within the exception, there will be no effective review process for 
potential non-enforcement under CAFTA-DR, and the law itself 
may become the subject of the types of challenges addressed above 
in Part II. According to Wang, “the limitations on the scope of 
enforceable environmental law [under CAFTA-DR] facilitates the 
opening of Central America’s biodiversity and other natural 
resources for market exchange and consumption.”131 Thus, while 
including a process for review of non-enforcement of domestic 
environmental laws may provide recourse for ensuring that trade 
and investment partners do not violate their biodiversity 
protection obligations, it is important to consider the exact scope of 
the process and evaluate how the review fits in with the rest of the 
text as a whole. 
C. Trans-Pacific Partnership 
The TPP is another example of an FTA that moves the 
environmental provisions directly into an environmental chapter 
in the main text.132 It has been argued that the TPP presented an 
opportunity to protect the important biodiversity of the Pacific Rim 
States, including through the enforcement of CITES obligations.133 
In a 2011 Green Paper, the US promoted the inclusion of 
biodiversity protection provisions with specific emphasis on trade 
in protected wildlife, marine fisheries, and illegal timber 
logging.134 The final TPP text seems to reflect this proposal to some 
extent by incorporating biodiversity provisions directly into the 
main text of the environmental chapter.135 There is a general 
 
130. Id.  
131. Id. at 284. 
132. See Trans-Pacific Partnership, art. 20, Feb. 4, 2016, available at OFF. 
OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-
agreements/trans-pacific-partnership/tpp-full-text [https://perma.cc/4DWH-
LGM6] [hereinafter TPP]. 
133. See Matthew Rimmer, Greenwashing the Trans-Pacific Partnership: 
Fossil Fuels, the Environment, and Climate Change, 14 SANTA CLARA J. INT’L L. 
488, 503 (2016); see also US TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, USTR GREEN PAPER ON 
CONSERVATION AND THE TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP 3–4 (2011), 
https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/fact-sheets/2011/ustr-green-
paper-conservation-and-trans-pacific-partnership [https://perma.cc/4VDV-
YGNS] [hereinafter USTR GREEN PAPER]. 
134. USTR GREEN PAPER, supra note 133, at 4. 
135. See TPP, supra note 132, at art. 20.13. 
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biodiversity protection article,136 as well as an article which 
addresses illegal trade in protected species137 and requires the 
parties to “exchange information and experiences on issues . . . 
including combating illegal logging and associated illegal 
trade . . . .”138 Furthermore, as discussed in more detail above in 
Part II.C, the TPP also directly addresses marine fisheries 
practices.139 
Although the TPP has not been ratified, it does provide an 
example of the more recent approach to including environmental 
and biodiversity protection provisions directly in the main text of 
the agreement. Furthermore, the TPP’s biodiversity provisions 
have largely been adopted in the final text of the Comprehensive 
and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, which 
was signed by the remaining parties after the withdrawal of the 
US.140 Under that agreement, each contracting party is required 
to ensure that there is effective access to private remedies for 
failure to enforce its relevant environmental laws, as well as to 
establish appropriate procedures for reviewing public submissions 
regarding the implementation of the environmental chapter.141 
Finally, the agreement establishes an Environment Committee 
designed to oversee the enforcement of the chapter.142 
D. Agreements Referring to Environmental Treaties 
or Domestic Laws 
As Madison Condon identifies, there is a recent trend—
particularly within US FTAs—to incorporate obligations within 
the treaty that are created by MEAs or domestic environmental 
laws, including those affecting biodiversity, as independent 
 
136. Id.  
137. Id. at art. 20.17. 
138. Id. at art. 20.17.3. 
139. Id. at art. 20.16. 
140. See CPTPP, supra note 87, at art. 20; but see id., at art. 20.17.5 n. 6 
(striking a portion of the correlating original TPP provision which required the 
contracting parties to take measures to address the take of, and trade in, species 
protected under the domestic law of another contracting party). 
141. See id. at arts. 20.7–20.8. 
142. See id. at art. 20.19. However, the role of the Environment Committee 
does not appear to be as expansive as that of the Commission for Environmental 
Cooperation established under the NAAEC. Compare id., with NAAEC, supra 
note 106, at arts. 9–14. 
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obligations between the contracting parties.143 At least with 
respect to US FTAs, this is due in large part to the Bipartisan 
Trade Deal reached on May 10, 2007, which required future FTAs 
to explicitly incorporate reference to a prescribed set of seven 
MEAs to which the US is a party.144 The deal requires binding non-
derogation obligations for domestic environmental laws and places 
environmental obligations on the same plane as the commercial 
obligations contained in the agreements.145 
There are several motivations for including reference to such 
MEAs in investment and free trade agreements. Firstly, it lends 
stronger and more developed enforcement and adjudication 
mechanisms to agreements which otherwise lack effective bite.146 
According to Condon, this process of reference to MEAs works to 
“legalize” these international norms by increasing their 
“obligation, precision, and delegation.”147 Essentially, it delineates 
the exact requirements of the obligations and renders them 
binding through stronger enforcement mechanisms.148 Secondly, 
increasing awareness of the inherent interactions between these 
agreements and environmental issues warrants addressing them 
together.149 Additionally, such inclusion can also be influenced by 
 
143. Condon, supra note 28, at 103–4, 110–11 (listing the recent FTAs with 
Peru, Colombia, South Korea, and Panama as examples of such agreements); see 
also CPTPP, supra note 87, at ch. 20. The EU-Peru and Colombia FTA similarly 
refers to MEAs which cover biodiversity. However, it excludes “tuna, whaling, and 
Antarctic marine life.” Condon, supra note 28, at 114–15. 
144. See Condon, supra note 28, at 110. The seven agreements are: CITES; 
the Montreal Protocol; the Convention on Marine Pollution, Inter-American 
Tropical Tuna Convention; the Ramsar Convention on Wetlands, International 
Whaling Convention; and the Convention on Conservation of Antarctic Marine 
Living Resources. Id. at 110 n.28. Note though that this list does not include the 
CBD, to which the US is not a party. See List of Parties, CONVENTION ON 
BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY, https://www.cbd.int/information/parties.shtml 
[https://perma.cc/VMC4-838Y].  
145. Condon, supra note 28, at 110–11. 
146. See id. (citing Jorge E. Viñuales, The Environment Breaks into 
Investment Disputes 5, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 1714–38 (M. 
Bungenberg, et al. eds., 2015)). 
147. Id. at 115–18 (citing Kenneth W. Abbott et al., The Concept of 
Legalization, 54 INT’L ORG. 401 (2000)). 
148. See id. at 115–18. 
149. See id. at 350, 378–79 (citing Lise Johnson, International Investment 
Agreements and Climate Change: The Potential for Investor-State Conflicts and 
Possible Strategies for Minimizing It, 39 ENVTL. L. REP. 11,147 (2009)); see also 
Ibironke T. Odumosu, The Antinomies of the (Continued) Relevance of ICSID to 
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political realities as well as complex negotiation strategies.150 
However, Condon notes that this process also represents a 
dissemination of the priorities of the more dominant economic 
power, potentially at the expense of the political process of the 
other contracting State(s), as well as the principle of sovereign 
control over their own natural resources.151 
In the context of an investment treaty that includes such 
provisions, Condon argues that certain investors, such as those 
“who establish forest preserves and nature sanctuaries,”152 could 
bring claims against the host country should it fail to effectively 
enforce its own environmental laws or the obligations established 
under the designated MEAs.153 The Peter A. Allard v. Government 
of Barbados arbitration provides an example of an attempt by an 
investor to bring such a claim.154 In that case, a Canadian investor 
developed an eco-tourism site in Barbados.155 The investor then 
claimed that Barbados violated its obligations under the bilateral 
investment agreement with Canada by failing to meet its 
international obligations under the Convention on Biological 
Diversity156 (“CBD”) and the Convention on Wetlands of 
International Importance,157 as well as its domestic obligations 
under the Barbados Marine Pollution Control Act.158 The investor 
 
the Third World, 8 SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 345, 373–74 (2007) (arguing that because 
international investment dispute resolution impacts environmental protection 
and human rights in addition to economic development, the process should take 
these multiple and diverse interests into account). 
150. See Condon, supra note 28, at 128–43 (reviewing negotiation theory in 
the context of FTAs). 
151. Id. at 119–21. For an articulation of the principle of sovereign control 
over a country’s own natural resources, see U.N. Conference on Environment and 
Development, Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, Principle 2, 
U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26 (Vol. I) (Aug. 12, 1992). 
152. Condon, supra note 28, at 126. 
153. Id. at 125. For a fuller discussion of the impacts of investment-
protection arbitration on biodiversity, see supra Part II.  
154. Id. at 125. 
155. Allard v. Gov’t of Barbados, PCA Case No. 2012-06, Notice of Dispute, 
¶¶ 1–5 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2009), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-
documents/italaw7972.pdf [https://perma.cc/3NJ5-FHYC]. 
156. See generally Convention on Biological Diversity, June 5, 1992, 1760 
U.N.T.S. 79.  
157. See generally Convention on Wetlands of International Importance 
Especially as Waterfowl Habitat, Feb. 2, 1971, T.I.A.S. No. 11084, 996 U.N.T.S. 
245. 
158. Allard, PCA Case No. 2012-06, Notice of Dispute, at ¶13.   
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alleged that Barbados failed to provide “full protection and 
security” as well as “fair and equitable treatment,” as required 
under the agreement, and that Barbados had indirectly 
expropriated the investment.159 
The United Nations Commission on International Trade Law 
tribunal first found that the government of Barbados had not 
caused any of the alleged environmental degradation,160 meaning 
that the investor could not succeed on the indirect expropriation 
claim.161 The tribunal also dismissed the fair and equitable 
treatment claim for lack of reliance by the investor on any specific 
representation by the government of Barbados,162 and found that 
the investor “failed to establish that Barbados violated its 
obligations of the [full protection and security] standard.”163 
Although the investor had originally sought approximately $34 
million for these alleged violations,164 the tribunal ultimately 
found against the investor, who was required to pay over $3 million 
in costs.165 While this case clearly does not provide a model for 
leveraging investment agreements to force contracting parties to 
comply with their international and domestic biodiversity 
protection obligations, it remains possible that other claims 
brought under the various free trade and investment agreements 
that refer to such obligations may prove more effective in doing so. 
1. United States-Peru Free Trade Agreement 
The US-Peru FTA166 provides an interesting example of an 
agreement which incorporates both domestic and international 
environmental law requirements with respect to logging. Peru’s 
forests are home to many valuable hardwoods, including cedar and 
 
159. Id. at ¶¶ 14, 16, 19. 
160. Allard v. Gov’t of Barbados, PCA Case No. 2012-06, Award, at ¶ 166 
(Perm. Ct. Arb. 2016), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-
documents/italaw7594.pdf [https://perma.cc/4HVG-2RCW]. 
161. Id. at ¶ 265. 
162. Id. at ¶ 226–27. 
163. Id. at ¶ 252. 
164. id. at ¶ 47(c). 
165. Id. at ¶ 316. 
166. United States-Peru Trade Promotion Agreement, Peru-U.S., Apr. 12, 
2006, available at OFF. OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE https://ustr.gov/trade-
agreements/free-trade-agreements/peru-tpa/final-text [https://perma.cc/9C8C-
BRE2] [hereinafter Peru-US FTA]. 
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mahogany, which are logged in high quantities and shipped around 
the world.167 Unfortunately, the region suffers from widespread 
illegal logging, in some cases of species protected under CITES.168 
According to some reports, illegal logging might account for as 
much as 80% of all Peruvian production.169 There is a forestry 
governance regime in place, but corruption and implementation 
issues have rendered the system ineffective at stemming the flow 
of illegal timber.170 
In 2006, the US signed an FTA with Peru in order to eliminate 
trade barriers and encourage investment.171 The FTA includes an 
article on biodiversity protection,172 as well as an annex which 
addresses governance of the logging industry in Peru and allows 
the US to supervise enforcement of Peruvian law (the “Forestry 
Annex”).173 Under the Forestry Annex, Peru is required to take 
steps to actually implement and enforce CITES,174 which it had 
already ratified in 1975 but had not been effectively enforcing.175 
Madison Condon argues that, “Peru eventually signed on to the 
‘stick’ of binding and enforceable forestry measures because it was 
also promised the ‘carrot’ of liberalized trade with the United 
States.”176 Therefore, the US-Peru FTA and its Forestry Annex can 
be seen as intended to strengthen the implementation of Peru’s 
 
167. See Matt Finer et. al., Logging Concessions Enable Illegal Logging 
Crisis in the Peruvian Amazon, 4 SCI. REP. 1, 1 (2014) . 
168. Id. at 1–2. 
169. See ENVTL. INVESTIGATION AGENCY, IMPLEMENTATION AND ENFORCEMENT 
FAILURES IN THE US-PERU FREE TRADE AGREEMENT (FTA) ALLOWS ILLEGAL 
LOGGING CRISIS TO CONTINUE 1 (2015) (citing MARILYNE PEREIRA GONCALVES ET 
AL., WORLD BANK, JUSTICE FOR FORESTS: IMPROVING CRIMINAL JUSTICE EFFORTS TO 
COMBAT ILLEGAL LOGGING (2012)), https://content.eia-
global.org/posts/documents/000/000/325/original/Implementation_and_Enforcem
ent.pdf?1468593199 [https://perma.cc/E9ZY-S9AL]. 
170. See Finer et al., supra note 167, at 1. 
171. See generally Peru-US FTA, supra note 166. 
172. See Condon, supra note 28, at 111–12. The article “contains mostly 
weak, non-binding obligations,” but it closely tracks the language of the CBD, 
which the US has not ratified. Id. 
173. See Peru-US FTA, supra note 166, at Annex 18.3.4 (Annex on Forest 
Sector Governance). 
174. Condon, supra note 28, at 112–13. 
175. See id. at 113 (noting Peru “sat comfortably in noncompliance for three 
decades” after signing CITES in 1975); see also List of Contracting Parties, CITES, 
https://www.cites.org/eng/disc/parties/chronolo.php [https://perma.cc/2557-F4D9] 
(providing a list of contracting parties).  
176. Condon, supra note 28, at 137. 
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freestanding international biodiversity obligations by creating a 
higher cost for non-compliance, i.e., trade sanctions or dispute 
resolution with the US. 
The Forestry Annex further requires Peru to pass new logging 
laws and regulations, increase criminal penalties and civil liability 
for violations, monitor CITES-listed species, and set quotas on 
exports of bigleaf mahogany.177 The Forestry Annex also allows US 
officials to oversee compliance of logging imports from Peru.178 
Finally, Peru was required to pass ninety-nine laws regarding 
forestry and land ownership to meet its environmental obligations 
under the FTA, a few of which were ultimately repealed in 
response to violent protests.179 
Since implementation began in 2009, the Forestry Annex has 
been criticized as actually enabling increased illegal logging in 
Peru,180 and falsification of documentation remains ongoing.181 
According to the Environmental Investigation Agency, although 
the Forestry Annex contains “laudable and innovative” obligations, 
lack of implementation and enforcement has rendered them 
ineffective.182 For example, while the Forestry Annex requires 
Peru to perform detailed audits at least every five years, none had 
been done by 2015.183 Furthermore, at least through June 2015 “no 
one, in either Peru or the US, [had] been held accountable for well-
documented illegalities.”184 However, in October of 2017, for the 
first time, the Office of the United States Trade Representative 
announced that it was taking steps to bar imports from a certain 
Peruvian exporter whom the Peruvian authorities had earlier 
found to be in violation of the relevant laws and regulations.185 
 
177. Peru-US FTA, supra note 166, at Annex 18.3.4(b)–(f); Condon, supra 
note 28, at 112 (explaining that the Forestry Annex is also subject to the dispute 
settlement system established under the FTA). 
178. Condon, supra note 28, at 112. 
179. Id. at 113–14. Some activists also criticized the laws as potentially 
making it easier “for indigenous groups to sell off their lands for the establishment 
of biofuel plantations.” Id. at 113. 
180. See Finer et al., supra note 167, at 1; see generally ENVTL. INVESTIGATION 
AGENCY, supra note 169. 
181. ENVTL. INVESTIGATION AGENCY, supra note 169, at 1. 
182. Id. 
183. Id. at 8. 
184. Id. at 2. 
185. USTR Announces Unprecedented Action to Block Illegal Timber Imports 
from Peru, OFF. OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE (Oct. 19, 2017), 
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Therefore, while in theory the US-Peru FTA should incentivize 
Peru to come into compliance with its obligations under CITES, as 
well as the additional independent obligations established under 
the Forestry Annex, in practice it has not yet been entirely effective 
in accomplishing either. Nevertheless, the action recently taken by 
the US Trade Representative may be a signal that the US will take 
a stronger stance on enforcement of Peru’s obligations under the 
Forestry Annex. This may provide the necessary push for Peru to 
ensure that it comes into compliance. 
IV. BIODIVERSITY AS INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY 
In addition to impacting biodiversity through investment and 
trade protection arbitrations, and through addressing biodiversity 
qua biodiversity in side agreements and environmental chapters, 
some agreements also regulate biodiversity as a form of 
intellectual property (“IP”).186 On the one hand, biodiversity can 
simply be exchanged for profit as if it were a commodity.187 
However, through the biotech industry, it has also become possible 
to turn biodiversity into “genetic gold” through such products as 
medicines, enhanced crops, and chemicals.188 This process often 
relies upon national or regional IP regimes, which in some cases 
apply to genetic resources.189 In many cases though, these laws 
violate the access requirements of the CBD.190 Thus, Andreas 
 
https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-
releases/2017/october/ustr-announces-unprecedented-action 
[https://perma.cc/W3FC-UMQ4].  
186. See, e.g., CPTPP, supra note 87, at ch. 18. 
187. Andreas Kotsakis, Change and Subjectivity in International 
Environmental Law: The Micro-Politics of the Transformation of Biodiversity into 
Genetic Gold, 3 TRANSNAT’L ENVTL. L. 127, 134 (2013). 
188. See id. at 130–33. 
189. See id. at 142 (arguing that biodiversity can have asset rather than 
commodity value, similar to a patent, under the right regulatory framework). 
190. Id. at 142 n.93 (citing Article 15(2) of the CBD as an example: “Each 
Contracting Party shall endeavour to create conditions to facilitate access to 
genetic resources . . . and not to impose restrictions that run counter to the 
objectives of the [CBD].”). The CBD also includes provisions on access and benefit 
sharing for genetic resources. This can be used as a tool either to fight against IP 
rights, or to “obtain favorable terms for commercial exploitation.” Sam F. Halabi, 
International Intellectual Property Shelters, 90 TUL. L. REV. 903, 947–48 (2016). 
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Kotsakis has argued that, unsurprisingly, “the market rationality 
of genetic gold won over the formal legal discourse of the CBD.”191 
It is often the case that stronger IP standards are established 
in developing countries at the behest of more developed countries 
through international FTAs.192 This can have the effect of creating 
tensions among the world’s wealthiest nations and developing 
countries.193 Keith Maskus and Jerome Reichman have argued 
that this “could raise fundamental roadblocks for the national and 
global provision of numerous . . . public goods, including scientific 
research, education, health care, biodiversity, and environmental 
protection.”194 This Part thus briefly looks at some of the ways that 
biodiversity is regulated as a form of IP, and its interactions with 
investment and free trade agreements. 
A. The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights 
Under the auspices of the WTO, the Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights195 (“TRIPS”) 
establishes baseline free trade and protection obligations for the 
member countries.196 Although biotechnology inventions would 
generally be subject to the patent requirements of the 
agreement,197 TRIPS also provides that the contracting parties 
may “exclude from patentability . . . plants and animals other than 
 
191. Kotsakis, supra note 187, at 143. 
192. Keith E. Maskus & Jerome H. Reichman, The Globalization of Private 
Knowledge Goods and the Privatization of Global Public Goods, 7 J. OF INT’L ECON. 
L. 279, 281 (2005). 
193. Halabi, supra note 190, at 922–23. It can also have the effect of raising 
prices of the ultimate products such that many consumers in the developing 
countries are unable to afford them. Id. Low- and middle-income states have 
begun to push back against the international IP regimes, and have sought specific 
agricultural IP protections. Id. at 937–39. 
194. Reichman & Maskus, supra note 192, at 283 (emphasis added); see also 
Halabi, supra note 190, at 930 (noting that IP protections have undermined the 
ability of developing states to provide for certain public goods, including the 
traditional preservation of natural resources). 
195. See generally Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World 
Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299 [hereinafter TRIPS]. 
196. See Aman Gebru, The Global Protection of Traditional Knowledge: 
Searching for the Minimum Consensus, 17 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 42, 
58 (2017). 
197. See TRIPS, supra note 195, at art. 27.1. 
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micro-organisms, and essentially biological processes for the 
production of plants or animals other than non-biological and 
microbiological processes.”198 However, the contracting parties 
must “provide for the protection of plant varieties either by patents 
or by an effective sui generis system,”199 such as the International 
Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants (“UPOV”).200 
1. International Convention for the Protection 
of New Varieties of Plants 
UPOV is an intergovernmental organization which aims to 
promote the development of new plant varieties and provide IP 
protection for them.201 The most recent UPOV convention, signed 
in 1991, establishes that the breeder of a uniform, distinct, stable, 
and new plant variety must first provide authorization for another 
party to take certain actions such as selling or trading the plant, 
or producing it.202 Thus, under the UPOV system, the breeder 
holds IP rights over the new variety for a certain time frame. 
However, the United Nations Women entity has found that 
this protection can also preclude local rural community members, 
especially women, from sharing seeds as a matter of “ensuring 
sustainability, resilience, and biodiversity, and reducing input 
costs.”203 This can be the case even where those plant varieties 
have been used by the local community for many years prior to the 
granting of IP rights to foreign companies.204 In many cases, these 
women possess local knowledge and engage in traditional practices 
 
198. Id. at art. 27.3(b). 
199. Id. 
200. See Halabi, supra note 190, at 930. 
201. See International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of 
Plants (UPOV), U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., https://www.uspto.gov/ip-
policy/patent-policy/international-convention-protection-new-varieties-plants-
upov 
[https://perma.cc/XYM8-UN8R] (last modified Jan. 8, 2019).  
202. See id. 
203. Rep. of the Expert Group Meeting on the CSW 62 Priority Theme: 
Challenges and Opportunities in Achieving Gender Equality and the 
Empowerment of Rural Women and Girls, at 12, U.N. Doc. EGM/RWG/Report 
(Sept. 20–22, 2017). 
204. Id. at 13. The report cites the historical medicinal use of pueraria 
mirifica by women in northern Thailand as an example of a plant that has now 
been patented by a foreign country. This patent may curtail the traditional use of 
the plant. Id. 
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which are vital for maintaining the resilience and production of the 
crop.205 While the 1991 UPOV convention does provide an 
exception for “small landholders who grow subsistence crops,” this 
could disproportionately impact women, since proof of secure 
landholdings is required.206 Thus, although the UPOV system is 
designed to protect IP rights with respect to new plant varieties, it 
can be used to exclude local communities from using or sharing the 
variety and may fail to consider traditional local knowledge and 
practices for maintaining the plant, which in some cases go back 
generations.207 
B. Traditional Knowledge 
Traditional knowledge of indigenous communities is often 
important for preserving and extracting value from biodiversity,208 
especially with respect to the genetic resources of plants.209 
Although various MEAs such as the CBD and the Nagoya 
Protocol210 address and protect traditional knowledge,211 it is not 
recognized under TRIPS.212 However, according to Aman Gebru, 
there is an increasing recent trend to include provisions on 
 
205. Id. at 11. 
206. Id. at 13. 
207. Another example of a treaty which impacts crop biodiversity is the 
International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture. That 
treaty “recognizes farmers’ rights” and “creates a multilateral system for access 
and benefit sharing.” Halabi, supra note 190, at 950. 
208. Gebru, supra note 196, at 49. 
209. Id. at 57. 
210. See generally Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and Fair 
and Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from their Utilization, Oct. 29, 2010, 
UNEP/CBD/COP/DEC/X/1. 
211. Gebru, supra note 196, at 56–57. The CBD includes aspirational 
provisions on the protection of traditional knowledge. The Nagoya Protocol 
establishes binding obligations regarding access and benefit sharing by requiring 
compliance checkpoints and domestic remedies, as well as the prior informed 
consent of knowledge providers and benefit sharing. Id. at 56–57. The Nagoya 
Protocol also “aimed to encompass the broader universe of drugs, medical 
therapies, agrochemical products, vaccines, and other products derived from 
genetic resources not regulated by other international instruments . . . [by] 
regulat[ing] access to genetic resources in party states . . . .” Halabi, supra note 
190, at 954. 
212. Gebru, supra note 196, at 58. However, the Global South is pushing for 
its inclusion therein. Id. at 58. There is also a potential conflict as to whether 
TRIPS or CBD would take precedence when evaluating traditional knowledge 
protection measures. Id. at 59. 
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traditional knowledge protection in FTAs.213 In contrast to other 
IP issues, these provisions are generally sought by developing 
countries rather than developed countries, who usually opt for 
more aspirational language.214 One such example is the TPP, 
which provides aspirational provisions in Articles 18 and 20.215 
The US-Peru FTA also includes an agreement on biodiversity and 
traditional knowledge which includes aspirational language 
addressing obtaining prior informed consent, equitable benefit 
sharing, patent examination, and access to information.216 
V. CONCLUSION 
It has been seen that investment and free trade agreements 
interact with biodiversity in a variety of sometimes conflicting 
manners. Firstly, investors and trade partners can use the dispute 
resolutions systems established under the agreements to protect 
their economic interests, including potentially at the expense of the 
contracting parties’ biodiversity conservation measures. However, 
in many of these agreements there are certain public interest 
exceptions that may be used in order to defend those protection 
measures, if properly crafted. Secondly, investment and free trade 
agreements increasingly are expressly addressing biodiversity 
conservation objectives in the text of the agreements themselves, 
thereby creating binding obligations for the parties to enforce their 
own environmental and biodiversity protection laws. Furthermore, 
many agreements also reference the obligations established by 
MEAs as similarly enforceable obligations. Finally, investment 
and free trade agreements can also regulate biodiversity as a form 
of IP, with various ensuing interactions with other multilateral 
agreements and systems, such as UPOV. 
In many of the examples analyzed in this Article, economic 
considerations prove to outweigh more purely conservationist 
concerns when the two conflict in the context of these agreements. 
However, this Article is not an exhaustive overview of the various 
 
213. Id. at 84. 
214. Id. at 84–86. 
215. See id. at 86–90. 
216. See Understanding Regarding Biodiversity and Traditional Knowledge, 
Peru-U.S., Apr. 12, 2006, available at 
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/agreements/fta/peru/asset_upload_file
719_9535.pdf [https://perma.cc/C6E2-2FP4]. 
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interactions under investment and free trade agreements, and 
thus it is impossible to draw definitive empirical conclusions 
herein regarding whether these agreements generally promote or 
hinder biodiversity conservation. One pattern that may be gleaned, 
however, is that over time these agreements have become more 
explicitly conscious of these inherent interactions, and the parties 
often seek to draw an appropriate balance between expansion of 
free trade and investment on the one hand, and their obligations 
to promote and protect biodiversity on the other. This is the case 
both where those obligations arise under domestic or international 
law, or are even established as freestanding under the agreement 
itself. 
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